The philosophy of Popper - T.E. Burke

It has been claimed for Sir Karl Popper that, among twentieth-century philosophers, he is the most influential philosopher of science, the most penetrating critic of Marxism and the most effective advocate of political freedom and the open society. His reputation extends far beyond the realm of academic philosophy. Indeed, for him the justification of philosophy has always lain in its relevance to other fields of human concern, both theoretical and practical. But, as a result, he has often been at odds with the cautious and introspective conceptions of philosophy prevalent through much of the academic world for much of his career. Academic philosophers have been slow to introduce his work to their students, and in comparison with, for example, his fellow countryman Wittgenstein he has received somewhat meagre critical attention.

Dr Burke seeks to introduce to those with a basic interest in philosophy Popper’s original ideas—on philosophy itself, science and pseudo-science, truth and relativism, historicism and freedom—and to explain their importance for philosophy and for other fields as well. He also examines their limitations, in particular the extent to which they are vitiated by a radical scepticism which, while commendably honest and wholesome to a certain point, is sometimes carried to an extreme where it threatens the whole foundation of Popper’s belief in scientific and social progress. An attempt is made to show how such extremes may be avoided by drawing on philosophical ideas and traditions, at first sight antithetical to Popper’s, but on closer examination complementary to them.